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PACIFIC RAILWAY.

BRITANNICUS' LETTERS IN OTTAWA CITIZEN.

“THE PACIFIC RAILWAY QUESTION.”

LETTER No. 1.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN.

DEAR SIR,—Under this heading we have just had from the Montreal Ministerial press, viz., *Herald*, *Witness* and *Star*, a series of articles urging, in effect, the impolicy of a Canadian Pacific Railway from ocean to ocean, wholly on Canadian ground. At the same time, with an inconsistency which can only be rightly read through the glamour of an “organized hypocrisy,” they hold forth, to use the words of the *Star*, that “owing to its magnitude, and involving as it does the vital interests of the Dominion, the question of constructing the Pacific Railway is, by all odds, the most important which could occupy the attention of the Canadian press and people.” “The Conservatives insist,” the *Star* goes on to say, “that the policy of the Macdonald Government concerning it was better than that of the present Administration.” The writer then gives his “facts” and “figures” and general prelections—wild, exceedingly—in support of *his* argument, concluding with the damning sentence—“The entire project appears to be nothing short of

A STUPENDOUS ACT OF FOLLY.

on the part of its originators, *as well as their successors*, and the Colonial Office authorities as well.” In other words, and as so emphatically put in the House by Mr. “Speak Now” Wood, in his memorable thirty shekelled speech against his former friends and masters in this “vital” matter of Pacific Railway in and for Canada—“Is the *mad* scheme of a *mad* Government.”

Where—*if anywhere*—the madness is, in the matter, I cannot, even at this advanced moment, after much actual

▲—Ry.

knowledge of the full truth of much of what, at the initiation of the scheme, was unavoidably assumed merely in predicate, really say. This much, however, I can say. That at the general election—one sprung on the country, as a *trap*—so strong and unanimous was public opinion in favor of the scheme, that even the Chief of the Ultra-Annexation Section of the Ministry of the day, the Hon. (and now Chief Justice) Dorion, on the hustings at Napierville, standing amongst the sons of old Chateauguay, and seeking then *and there* their “sweet voices” for election, answered, when anxiously asked on the point, “*our scheme*” (i.e., *The Pacific Railway*),

“WILL BE IN THE MAIN THAT OF THE LATE MINISTRY”

As to the soundness—*impos* or *compos*—of the mind of the honorable gentleman, to whom, according to all reports, the Chief Justiceship of our Supreme Court has just been offered, and who now, by the pre-eminent ability manifested by him in his present high office, commands the respect and approving regards of all parties, I leave it to his successor in the office of Minister of Justice to this Dominion, and to the “Stars,” varied and somewhat erratic and nebulous perhaps, in his immediate galaxy to show forth. Our night, political, is dark, no doubt, and we look anxiously for *Aurora*, (not Mr. Blake’s however), look for the dawning of a better and a longer day.

No! the cry, utterly false, of the moment, on the part of a few, a very few, not “nine-tenths” as Sir Alexander Galt in his letter of the other day hath it, yea, not one-tenth of one-tenth of one-tenth of the *people proper* of Canada, of “No Pacific Railway, I say, is

NOT MADNESS EXACTLY BUT SOMETHING WORSE,

something rather of that treachery to national entity, which men call treason. I speak plain in this matter, for the occasion, in its imminence, calls for it.

And now as to this issue of relative schemes, the so-called “Macdonald one” and so-called “Mackenzie one,” I take up the gage of our enemies, and shall do my best to show which is the better cause. The ground I propose to go over is too extended for a single letter and will probably require

a series, but which I shall make as short as possible, compatibly with the nature and importance of the case.

I purpose to show, in the first instance, what the first project was, and in doing so to confine myself, as much as possible, to authenticated *data*, and to deductions which may fairly defy cavil—and all to the effect that the first scheme was one which, as ever appeared, and as still appears to me, and as I believe to all of Canada, or out of it, who had honestly looked into it, was, and is best calculated for the immediate consolidation and

PERMANENT WELFARE OF CANADA

as well as for the advancement and safeguard of those larger and higher interests, material and moral, involved in the work in its national and international aspects.

As to the details of the scheme I shall, as need be for the argument, take them up; and in so far as space in your columns will allow, shall make my reasoning as exhaustive as possible.

In adopting the term “Mackenzie scheme,” however, I beg distinctly, *in limine*, to say that I do not consider it as a Pacific Railway in any sense. When I come to it in discussion I shall explain this.

In the meantime, in connection with this view, I would point to the incident that at this moment I have evidence of the fact in the open and un-cry avowal of “No Pacific Railway” in Canada on the part of Mr. Mackenzie’s special nominee, Mr. Thomas Workman, (Oh, *unbelieving* Thomas!) in the pending Montreal election. Add to that, as evidence indubitable, our Premier’s own speech at his own Sarnia, just forty-eight hours ago. At the same time Messrs. Blake and Huntington—statesmen whose avowed policy is to drive British Columbia *out* of our Confederation—hold seat and high rule in Executive in Ottawa.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, 14th October.

The Montreal *Star*, so far as we understand, is an Independent and not a *Ministerial* journal.—ED. CITIZEN.

LETTER No. 2.

The Macdonald Scheme.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN :

SIR,—The theme is a large one, and for fair dealing should be accompanied with an extended line of introductory remark to show, as it were, the immediate “reason (necessity) of the thing;” but, as the public mind has been, we assume, for the nonce, already favorably impressed on this point, and ~~that~~ all effort to change it, now and of late, has so far failed, at least to any extent worthy of mark, we defer observation on this head to general comment, in conclusion, on review of the comparative schemes in question.

THE SCHEME AS FORMULATED IN CONTRACT,

and as set forth in the charter was laid thus: “Whereas, by an Act of the Parliament of Canada,”—we cite verbatim from the charter act—“passed in the thirty-fifth year of our reign, entitled an Act respecting the Canadian Pacific Railway, it is provided, upon the considerations therein declared, that a railway to be called ‘The Canadian Pacific Railway,’ should be made in conformity with the agreement referred to in the preamble to the said Act, and should extend from some point *on or near* Lake Nipissing, and on the south shore thereof to some point on the *shore of the Pacific Ocean*; both the said points to be determined by the Governor in Council, and the course and line of the said railway between the said points to be subject to the approval of the Governor in Council.”

“And wheaeas it is, by the said Act, further provided, that two, and *only* two certain branch lines, viz: The Pembina one and the then contemplated Nepigon one (if required and as might be determined by ultimate survey for location) should be constructed within certain periods, viz., the former by 31st December, 1874; the latter, together with the *whole* ‘*Lake Superior section,*’ from Lake Supcrior to Red River, by the 31st December, 1876.”

RAILWAY.

“That the Company may and shall lay out, construct, equip, maintain and work a continuous railway, of the width

or gauge of four feet eight and one-half inches; which railway shall be made in conformity with the Act hereinbefore recited, and with this our royal charter; and such railway shall extend from such point on or near Lake Nipissing, and on the south shore thereof, to some point on the shore of the Pacific Ocean, both the said points to be determined by the Government, and the course and line of the said railway to be subject to the approval of the Government."

Then follow provisions as to "specifications" to be agreed on by the Government and the Company. And further, it was stipulated—Sec 8.

"That the Company shall" [should] "within two years from the 20th July, 1871, commence simultaneously the construction of the railway from the Pacific Ocean towards the Rocky Mountains, and from a point [*i. e.* on or near the south shore of Lake Nipissing, as fixed by Act of Parliament as already stated] in the Province of Ontario, hereafter [thereafter] to be determined by the Government, towards the Pacific Ocean, to *connect the seaboard of British Columbia with the railway system of Canada, i. e., by a continuous railway wholly in Canada.* The whole to be finished within ten years from 20th July, 1871."

"The capital stock of the company shall be ten million dollars [distributed rateably, according to population, throughout the provinces in the Federation, and in the sums respectively, stated in the charter] which shall not be increased but by Act of Parliament [such capital stock having been already subscribed as aforesaid] to be held in shares of one hundred dollars each, which shall in all respects be deemed personal property, and ten per centum thereon *shall be paid into the hands of the Receiver-General of Canada*, in money or Canadian Government securities, within one month after the date of these presents, to remain in his hands until otherwise ordered by Parliament." Interest on deposit while unforfeited.

The section following, at considerable length, provides for calls on shares after the ten per centum thereof so placed in deposit.

By section "41"—too long for citation at present—power to issue bonds for construction to an amount "which

shall not exceed forty thousand dollars per mile, to be issued in proportion to the length of railway to be constructed," is given to the company, such bonds to be a "first charge on the railway and its appurtenances."

LAND GRANT.

"Fifty millions acres of land, in blocks [alternate] not exceeding twenty miles in depth on *each side* of such main line." [We italicise the words "each side," for they vary—vary very much to the advantage of the grantees—from the terms *quoad hoc* of the Mackenzie scheme, according to which the railway may *bisect* the "blocks of twenty square miles each" (alternate) "along the line of said railway."] The blocks, in the former as in the latter case, to be "alternate," but with a frontage or "width" of "not less than six miles nor more than twelve miles, the alternate blocks to be held in reserve by the Government at the "upset price" of two dollars and a half per acre, the average value as predicated in the contract of the lands so granted.

Special provision is made for arrangement with the Province of Ontario as to grant in that portion of the railway within it: and further the charter provided:—

"That if it shall be found that any of the alternate blocks laid out along the line of the railway are unfit for settlement, the company shall not be bound to receive from the Government any greater depth of land in such blocks than one mile, computed from the railway.

That the lands to be granted in aid of the main line of railway from out of the lands of the Dominion, and the lands to be granted in aid of the said branches (Pembina and Nepigon) shall consist of such land as shall be found east of the Rocky Mountains, between the parallels forty-nine and fifty-seven of north latitude, and the Company shall not be bound to receive any lands which are not of the fair average quality of the land in the sections of country best adapted for settlement lying within those limits; and the same shall be laid out as nearly as may be, *contiguous to the lands granted along the main line of railway*, and to the Lake Superior Branch."

We specially emphasize this passage; because the terms—most loose and really most reprehensible—in the Mackenzie scheme, allow of *selection anywhere* in the whole Northwest,

including coal and gold lands for any number of miles of railway done. Of this, more anon.

SUBSIDY IN MONEY.

“That a subsidy or aid in money, amounting to \$30,000,000, is hereby granted to the company, payable from time to time by instalments at intervals of one month as any portion of the railway is proceeded with, in proportion to the length, difficulty of construction and cost of such portion, such proportions to be ascertained and settled in the same manner as is herein provided with respect to the grants of land.” Costs of survey to be included in such subsidy.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES.

That the company may by by-law create a Board of Trustees to consist of three persons, to be chosen and to be removeable at pleasure, as follows, that is to say : one member thereof by the Government, one other member thereof by the Board of Directors, and the one other member thereof by the bondholders, in such a manner as may be provided by such by-law.

The duties and powers of this Board are defined at much length, and are obviously in safeguard of the interests of the Government and bondholders, as well as for proper function of the company in the course of their work.

It ought to be stated also that a telegraph line, in connection with the railway, and for public utility is amply provided for in the charter. And further it was provided that the company should convey by their railway whatever military forces, naval or military stores, ammunition, guns, baggage, &c., should be required by the military or naval authorities, “on such terms and conditions and under such regulations as the Government should from time to time make.”

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, 15th October, 1875.

LETTER No. 3.

Further Consideration of the Scheme.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN :

SIR,—In my last I was longer than I intended to be, but could not well be shorter, as the contract itself was so

terse and so full of detail—providing everything, and against every contingency—that I found it impossible to further abbreviate; and besides, I happened to be hurried, by press of urgent duties, when I wrote. One word, however, before I close on this head.

THE MACDONALD CONTRACT

was framed eminently in the public interest, and in terms to defy the acutest hypercriticism of its bitterest assailants. There was, in safeguard of public interest, no flaw in it, and no one, of any character at stake for professional ability or rectitude, dared to pretend, in the House, nor even in the press, that there was any in it. On the contrary, the defect or fault of the contract was that it was *too onerous*, “*hard*,” and *restrictive on the contractors*, and from the tenor of Sir Hugh Allan’s testimony on this point, on the Royal Commission, they had ^{carefully} begun to feel this. For instance, in the matter of bond issue, the restriction to forty thousand dollars per mile was too narrow. In my humble opinion, taking the total length of line from the eastern terminus to the Pacific shore at 2,665 miles, my estimate, as stated in detail in my letters of 1869, and as subsequently confirmed by actual survey, as reported by Mr. Fleming, and giving a total estimated cost of \$150,000,000, viz.: 50,000,000 acres at \$2.50 per acre, and \$30,000,000 in money. The bond margin should have been wider, viz., \$60,000 per mile. Other points in the same line of remark I might make, but forbear for the present.

FEASIBILITY OF THE MACDONALD LINE.

“Thirty millions of dollars and some fifty millions of acres of land were devoted to the work of constructing a road by a line that had never been surveyed, through an unknown land save to the fur trader and the Indian.”

So says the *Star* in his article under consideration.

It is not true.

In the first place, at the very initiation of the project the Government had before them, abundance of reliable information derived from the late Mr. Waddington’s reports and plans of actual survey from the Pacific coast eastward to the valley of the river Montreal in the Ottawa Valley, or at least, of some of the most difficult portions of the route, and a careful and exhaustive collection of facts from Imperial

bluebooks and our own as to our north-west, and from the Crown Land Office of British Columbia, and also from the ever faithfully kept itineraries, journals, reports and maps, [M.S.S.] of leading officers in the Hudson's Bay Company's service lent for the occasion, and from the Thompson and other professional reports of exploratory survey in our own archives, and in all these the Government had abundant *data* to go on. But further. In April, 10th, 1872, ten months before the date of charter in question, Mr. Fleming, the Engineer-in-Chief of the work, published his progress report, showing enough to confirm the assumption of feasibility; and on the 2nd of that month, on the strength of actual knowledge acquired the Government by formal Minute of Council adopted the Yellow Head Pass—as first indicated by Waddington and myself—as the “*gate*”—*railway gate*—to British Columbia from the east. From that time to the date of contract the survey with a staff of some twenty-two or twenty-four companies strongly equipped—a survey force of power and effective energy beyond parallel—was continued untiringly, and by that time it was fully known to the contracting parties that *not only a feasible line of railway but one infinitely easier, cheaper and better than any possible American one, from our Eastern Railway System to the Pacific Ocean, existed within our own borders!*

I state this from thorough personal knowledge; but to prove the fact I would, but briefly, refer to Mr. Fleming's last report of survey, viz: that of 1874, and which has been scattered broadcast over the land. His conclusion—see page 34-5 in general summary—is thus expressed by himself, viz: “*That the practicability of establishing railway communication across the continent, wholly within the limits of the Dominion, is no longer a matter of doubt.*”

It may indeed”—he goes on to say—“be now accepted as a certainty, that a route has been found, generally possessing favorable engineering features, with the exception of a short section approaching the Pacific coast; which route, taking its entire length, including the exceptional section alluded to, will on an average show lighter work and will require less costly structures than have been necessary on many of the railways now in operation in the Dominion.”

In my next, I propose taking up the "Mackenzie Scheme."

BRITANNICUS,

OTTAWA, 15th Oct., 1875.

LETTER No. 4.

Further Consideration of the Scheme.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN :

"THE MACKENZIE SCHEME,"

As originally laid, is to be found in Chap. 14 of our Dominion Acts of 1874. (Assented to, 26th May, 1874.)

THE LINE OF RAILWAY

is defined thus :—

"Section 1. A railway to be called the 'Canadian Pacific Railway' shall be made from some point near to and south of Lake Nipissing to some point on British Columbia on the Pacific Ocean, both the said points to be determined and the course and line of the said railway to be approved of by the Governor in Council.

"Section 2. The whole line of the said railway, for the purpose of its construction, shall be divided into four sections : The first section to begin at a point near to and south of Lake Nipissing, and to extend towards the upper or western end of Lake Superior, to a point where it shall intersect the second section hereinafter mentioned ; the second section to begin at some point on Lake Superior, to be determined by the Governor in Council, and connecting with the first section, and to extend to Red River, in the Province of Manitoba ; the third section to extend from Red River, in the Province of Manitoba, to some point between Fort Edmonton and the foot of the Rocky Mountains, to be determined by the Governor in Council ; the fourth section to extend from the western terminus of the third section to some point in British Columbia on the Pacific Ocean."

BRANCHES.

"Section 3. Branches of the said railway shall also be constructed as follows, that is to say :—

"*First*.—A branch from the point indicated as the proposed eastern terminus of the said railway to some point on

the Georgian Bay, both the said points to be determined by the Governor in Council.

“*Secondly*.—A branch from the main line near Fort Garry, in the Province of Manitoba, to some point near Pembina on the southern boundary thereof.”

By section 4, these branches are to be “considered, to all intents and purposes, as forming part of the Canadian Pacific Railway.”

TELEGRAPH LINE.

“Section 5. A line of electric telegraph shall be constructed in advance of the said railway and branches, along their whole extent respectively, as soon as practicable, after *the location* of the time shall have been determined upon.”

By Section 6. The “guage” (gauge) of the railway is defined to be four feet eight inches and a half; and further it is laid down, as a distinctive principle in the *manipulation* of the scheme, that the “grades of the railway, and the materials and manner of and in which the several works forming part thereof shall be constructed, and the mode of working the railway, including the description and capacity of the locomotive engines and other rolling stock, shall be such as shall be determined by the Governor in Council.”

And to make certainty doubly sure on this score, it is enacted, by Section 7, that—“The said Canadian Pacific Railway and the branches or sections hereinbefore mentioned, and the stations, bridges and other works connected therewith, and all engines, freight, and passenger cars and rolling stock shall be constructed under the general superintendence of the Department of Public Works,” and, of course, of its own proper workmen.

And further, still, for jobbery, it is enacted by Section 8, that—“The Governor in Council may *divide* the several sections of the said railway into *sub-sections*, and may contract with any person, co-partnership, or company, or company incorporated * * * for the construction of any section or *sub-section* of the said railway, including all works connected therewith,” &c., subject to the following provisions:—

“1. That the works or any section or sub-section of the said railway shall not be given out to any contractor or con-

tractors except after tenders shall have been obtained for the same." [NOTE.—So far well, but the Departmental principle now, and of late, as exemplified in the Palen and certain large canal contract affairs, is evidently a very uncertain one in this matter of "tenders."]


"2. That the contract for any portion of the said works shall not be given to any contractors unless such contractors give satisfactory evidence that they *possess*—[NOTE—"Possess!" but, pray, with what security of continued possession pending contract?—a capital of at least four thousand dollars per mile of their contract, and of which twenty-five per cent. in money, Government *or other* sufficient securities approved by the Governor in Council, shall have been deposited to the credit of the Receiver-General," &c.

SUBSIDY.

"3. That the total sum to be paid to the contractors shall be stipulated in the contract, and shall be ten thousand dollars for each mile of the section or sub-section contracted for—[NOTE.—That, for whole line, including branches, would make up fully \$30,000,000, to which is to be added what follows as to the four per cent. interest for twenty-five years on capital on construction.]—and that such sum (*i.e.*, \$10,000 per mile) shall be paid to the contractors as the work progresses, by monthly payments, in proportion to the value of the work then actually performed (according to the estimates of the engineers designated for the purpose by the Minister of Public Works) as compared with the value of the whole work contracted for, including rolling stock and all things to be done or furnished by the contractors; and excepting money arising from the sale of lands, as hereinafter provided, no further sum of money shall be payable to the contractors, as principal, but interest at the rate of four per cent. per annum for twenty-five years from the completion of the work, on a sum (to be stated in the contract) for each mile of the section or sub-section contracted for, shall be payable to the contractors in like manner and proportion, and on like conditions, as payments are to be made on the principal sum above mentioned; and the tenders of the work shall be required to state the lowest sum per mile on which such interest and guarantees will be required."

This, in effect, opens, it may be said, a fathomless gulf of expenditure *nomine* "Pacific Railway." It is the most reckless and astounding piece of legislation I know of, and even already, *in the face of an adverse vote* in one branch of the Legislature, viz.: of twenty-three (or twenty-five) to eighteen in the Senate in the matter of the Georgian Branch contract, although no possible part of the Pacific Railway proper, is fast being acted on. Of this, more anon.

LANDS.

"4. That a quantity of land, not exceeding twenty thousand acres for each mile of the section or subsection contracted for, shall be appropriated in alternate sections of twenty square miles each *along* the line of the said railway." [NOTE.—Not on *each side*, and to the full depth of the twenty miles on *each side*, in alternate blocks as in the Macdonald scheme]—"or at a convenient *distance therefrom*, each section having a frontage of not less than three miles, nor more than six miles, on a line of the said railway, and that two-thirds of the quantity of land so appropriated shall be sold by the Government"—[no limit, minimum or maximum, as to price] "at such prices as may be from time to time agreed upon between the Governor in Council and the contractors, and the proceeds thereof accounted for and paid half yearly to the contractors, free from any charge of administration or management—the remaining third to be conveyed to the contractors. The said lands to be of fair average quality, and not to include any land already granted or occupied under any patent, license of occupation or *pre-emption*" (Query—squatter?)  "right," "and when a sufficient quantity cannot be found in the immediate vicinity of the railway"—[as in the whole 600 miles, in *Ontario* from Nipissing to the western boundary of Ontario, beyond Lake Superior]—"then the same quantity or as much as may be required to complete such quantity, shall be appropriated at such *other* places as may be determined by the Governor in Council." Not, be it remarked, as in the Macdonald scheme, restricting the grant in such case, to *contiguity* to other lands, granted, *along the line*. As before stated, this (the Mackenzie Act) gives the power of indefinite selection over the whole vast area of our Dominion wild lands.

In connection with this, I would cite, from the same statute book the following—Chap. 19, (An Act to amend the Dominion Lands Act), sec. 9. “Section forty-four of the said hereinbefore first cited Act” (35 V., c. 23—“The Dominion Lands Act”) “is hereby repealed, and the following is substituted for and shall be read as the said section forty-four. The Minister of the Interior shall have power to protect any person or persons desiring to carry on *coal mining in unsurveyed territory*, in the possession of the lands on which such mining may be carried on, provided, that before entering on the working of such mines, such person or persons make written applications to the local agent to purchase such land: * * survey * * estimate * * number of acres * * which shall not exceed”—[i. e. for each person or body of persons]—“six hundred and forty acres, “*at the rate of one dollar per acre.*” No matter how valuable the coal measures be! and some of them are reported of nearly twenty feet in thickness, cropping out conveniently on the river bank, and of good quality for all industrial uses of such article. British Columbia best kinds, including anthracite command from \$12 to \$20 per ton in San Francisco, or at least did so lately, and the demand for it is ever increasing.

The coal of the Saskatchewan, McLeod, Athabaska, Peace and Mackenzie Rivers, is lignite, or ^{tertiary} territory coal, a compact bitumen, good for forge work, as proved at Fort Edmonton by the Hudson's Bay Company, and by such scientists as Sir John Richardson, and by our own geological staff, I believe, has been most favorably reported on. Moreover, ever close by it is iron ore and limestone in abundance. To throw away such wealth—vital wealth—of a nation is simply worse than folly.

My criticisms in this letter are long, but they are so from a desire to do Mr. Mackenzie *every justice*. In my next I propose to show how his whole “four sections” of P.R. have been virtually dropped by him, leaving to us two *worse than useless so-called branches*, and a pretended mixed land and water—or substitutional link-stringed sausage-like line—the whole involving a waste, absolute, of many millions of the people's money, and at the same time, by that very waste, dis-

abling us from ever accomplishing a Pacific Railway of our own.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, October 16th, 1875.

LETTER No. 5.

Further Consideration of the Scheme.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN:

As part of the "Mackenzie scheme," and an important incident in it, I would now touch on

THE BRITISH COLUMBIA DIFFICULTY.

That the aim and policy of the Mackenzie Ministry is, and has ever been, to drive British Columbia out of the Union, and thereby leave to the American Northern Pacific Railway Company the monopoly of railway terminus and seaport on the Northern Pacific coast, with command of the Northern Pacific trade, there can be no doubt. The concurrence of all facts and acts on that side of the present issue, lead conclusively to this as the *primum mobile* of the "difficulty" as raised—raised in obvious American behalf.

As on all false issues, so in this, fallacy and untruth have played much their part to subvert truth and right.

The assumed ground on which the repudiation of the Federal pact with British Columbia was made, was, as we all know, the pretence that it was "impossible" to accomplish within the ten years prescribed in clause eleven of the "Terms of Union," the railway in question. On that point we have evidence of the fact in the American Pacific Railway, a larger and far more difficult work, constructed in less than half that time, and that when circumstances were most unfavorable for such extra strain on American labor and financial resources, viz.: at the end of their terrible war, that there was ample time to do the work. On that score the contractors, so far as appears from their testimony on the Royal commission and from their course in the matter, had no fears whatever. The Engineer-in-Chief had himself stepped every inch of the way, and reported, as the result of actual survey, two or three lines of feasible route. So that

as to the "*possibility*" of the thing there was really no reasonable ground for doubt.

But, moreover, even if the physical difficulties of the route were such as to absolutely call for a prolongation of time for completion, the *legal obligation* in so far as the Dominion Government was concerned, still ever held with full force. On this point Sir John Macdonald's opinion, as given, commends itself as sound in reason, and we may all well assume as sound in law, whatever, to the contrary, Mr. Blake (Mr. Mackenzie's present Minister of Justice) may say, or decline openly to say. But to proceed.

I take up the blue-book of last Session (a copy got with great difficulty), styled "Message relative to the Terms of Union with the Province of British Columbia." From pages thirty-five to forty is a long and augmentative Minute of Council, dated 17th Sept., 1874. It runs thus: "The Committee of Council have had under their consideration the despatch of the Right Honorable Lord Carnarvon, relating to the complaints of the British Columbia Government with respect to the Pacific Railway, and suggesting certain modifications made by the Dominion Government, through Mr. Edgar, on the 8th May last."

The Minute goes on to respond to the different propositions laid by Lord Carnarvon, but while, as compelled by the inherent force of these most reasonable propositions, the Cabinet of Canada yield, or rather pretend to yield, with a singular—I shan't say perversity, for that would be unparliamentary, perhaps—singular—taste, say—keep up a running comment of protest, in the course of which they manifest clearly their intention to make out their case, if possible. For instance, in page 37, they say:—"Whatever may be the route finally chosen, the line will of necessity traverse a country with exceedingly rough topographical features for a distance of five or six hundred miles from the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains to the extreme limit of the Province on the Pacific."

This statement is very incorrect, save as to roughness to some extent. The average breadth—see any good map—of British Columbia is only about 400 miles, and as the heads of the inlets, Bute, Burrard's, or Bella Coola, or Douglas, to be

touched by railway, penetrate from forty to fifty miles inland, the actual traverse would be only about 350 miles. Mr. Fleming's charts show this.

The Minute goes on to say :—“ The country is an immense plateau which maintains the general elevation to within a few miles of the sea, but often rises into imshapely mountain ranges; some of these ranges tower to a height of over 9,000 feet.”

This is singularly incorrect. Mr. Fleming's report of 1874 shows it to be so. His description of the Chilcotin Plain, and that still lower plateau whose easterly outlet is the Peace River Pass—Pass with ascertained height of only “ 1,750 ” (seventeen hundred and fifty) feet above sea level—gives an average from this height to only about *one-third* of the pretended “ 9,000 feet ” in question, and the highest height *visible* reported (see page 117) is laid by Mr. Marcus Smith, engineer-in-chief, conducting the survey in British Columbia, at only from 4,200 to 4,500 feet above the sea level, while as per chart No. 4 to the report, the highest point of *railway* route there, is laid at only 3,700 feet.

I thus allude to this incident in evidence of the animus of the dictator or dictators of the Minute in question.

But further, while Lord Carnarvon insists upon a *continuous line of railway* from the Pacific to Lake Superior, they answer only thus :—“ It is intended by the Government that the utmost diligence shall be *manifested* in obtaining a speedy line of communication by rail *and water* from Lake Superior westward, completing the various links of railway as fast as possible, consistent with that prudent course which a comparatively poor and sparsely settled country should adopt.

* * * The Committee advise that Lord Carnarvon be informed that, while in no case could the Government undertake the completion of the *whole* line in the time mentioned ” (viz. 1890) “ an extreme unwillingness exists to another limitation of time : but if it be found absolutely necessary to secure a present settlement of the controversy by *further concessions*, a pledge may be given that the portion *west* of Lake Superior will be completed so as to afford connection by rail ” (*i.e.*, rail *and water*, as above-stated in the same Minute) “ with existing lines of railway, through a portion of the

United States and by Canadian waters during the season of navigation by the year 1890 as suggested."

And how have they carried out even this substitutional undertaking?

Only, so far as known, putting the "links" of the *Dawson route* under contract for railway. That route, at its eastern terminus, is about a hundred miles south, and *out* of the shortest and best (the Nipegon) line of route, as laid by Mr Fleming, and over a much greater height and through rougher country.

The portage links on this route are numerous, and vary between a few yards and a quarter of a mile or so, on an average between Lake Shebandowan and the Lake of the Woods.

To put "steel rails" with, of course, corresponding locomotive engines on such links of portage, would be like putting elephants to wheelbarrows. An ordinary tramway, costing less than one quarter the cost of steel rails alone, would answer all purposes, and be best.

But, dear sir, who, with the Port of Duluth close at hand, and offering continuous rail transport thence to Manitoba, would ever think of taking such a trail, broken, arduous and almost dangerous—as the Dawson-Mackenzie route—for locomotives, would have scarcely space to stop, as well as start, on those ^{rough} linking passages? The absurdity of the scheme is evident.

As to the railway route westward of Red River, that, according to all accounts, is intended to be equally, yea, much more, off the true line, by a "linking" digression through the irreclaimable, and for any commercial passage, impassable swamps of the hyperborean Winnipegosis.

Beyond this section, No. 3 of the Statute of 1874, we have the British Columbia section. As to it all ^{we} have, yet, from Mr. Mackenzie, is, that he has had some three hundred and sixty-five persons, all summer past, scouring the country, in "survey" to find a route. "None"—they say—"so blind, as those who *won't* see." Nearly one hundred years ago, another Alexander McKenzie (brave Sir Alexander) had no difficulty—not the slightest—to find a way from Montreal via our Peace River, to the shore of the Pacific.

Besides, our own Chief Engineer has—and in his report and plans, in exhaustive detail, *published nine months before the date of the Minute of Council, aforesaid*—showed, not only a feasible, but comparatively to the American (with its more than double of mountain height and way) an exceedingly favorable line.

Last not least, I take up

THE GEORGIAN BAY BRANCH.

The scheme, as I have before said, is not and cannot be proper, or in any way belong to the Pacific Railway scheme. It is, to all intents and purposes, an *American* work to draw to American ports, New York and Boston. To call it a “branch,” and at the same time insist—as Mr. Mackenzie in the aforesaid Minute of Council, and has ever since, otherwise, done—on the eastern terminus of the Pacific Railway being fixed to “some point on the western shore of Lake Superior,” six hundred miles from such branch, and nearly eight hundred miles from the present Canadian system of railway, is simply gibber. And what, to the public treasury, will be the

COST ?

I cite the terms of the Foster contract, as published. Length of road, estimated in contract at eighty-five miles:—

Subsidy, cash, \$10,000 per mile	\$850,000
“ “ “ 4 per cent. for twenty-five years on \$7,500 per mile.....	637,500
Land—selection throughout all our North-West—say (an extreme minimum) \$5 per acre, 20,000 acres per mile.....	8,500,000
	<hr/>
	\$9,987,500

Add for utterly useless telegraph line in advance of location of railway line, and in the teeth of the statute <i>ad hoc</i>	800,000
	<hr/>
	\$10,787,500
Also, we may say, loss on steel rails, probably	500,000
	<hr/>
	\$11,287,500

Finally, loss of survey plans by fire, reported at \$1,500,000, but say	1,000,000
	<hr/>
	\$12,287,500

OVER TWELVE MILLION DOLLARS

lost, or about to be, and which to that extent would cripple Canada in any further effort for a Pacific Railway.

The figures I give are really *within* mark, and if challenged, I am prepared to prove them.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, October 18th, 1875.

LETTER No. 6.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN:

Having thus hastily presented the two schemes, I would, before passing to another head, just briefly observe as to relative character and bearing, that in the former,

“THE MACDONALD SCHEME,”

we have, in the statute, charter, contract, and every State paper and official report and document on the subject, besides the vast field work done at the very start, the strongest possible evidence of the honesty of purpose, practicability, and proper adaptation of means to ends in view. In this respect the scheme, as laid and started, bore, on its face, the character of reality for the public good. On the other hand, according to the internal evidence of its inherent defects and faults, the latter

“THE MACKENZIE SCHEME”

can claim no such merit; but, to say the least of it, is a sham and mischievous delusion,

Another feature worthy of remark in the issue is that the Mackenzie Government have ever ignored the national and international aspect of the work.

They, and those who write for them, treat it as merely—as they call it—a “domestic” work, and by which, the country—the present vast wilds to be traversed—^{one} first to be filled up with settlers by means of the rail-water routes of Mr. Mackenzie. All this is fatuous folly.

The whole, from Nipissing to the Pacific shore is, as we all know, a comparative wild, with physical features and general geodesy of such character as to require—*absolutely require*—a railway from the settled portion of Canada, with

its railway system eastward, direct, or direct as possible, to Manitoba and our further North-West. This route, namely, via the north shore of Lake Superior, is thus stated by Mr. Fleming in his report of 1874, page 33:—

“FROM FORT GARRY TO TORONTO AND MONTREAL.—*All rail.*”

	To Toronto. Miles.	To Montreal. Miles.
Via the Canadian Pacific Railway to Nipissing, and continuation.....	1,173	1,288
Via Pembina and Chicago, Detroit, &c.....	1,589	1,925
Difference in favor of the Canadian Pacific Railway.....	416	637

From Red River to the Pacific Ocean, as we all now know, there is no course of navigation that would be available for extended commerce, and for the whole route, *even for internal development alone, a railway is necessary.*

But, looking at the work in its bearing as *an Inter-Oceanic Highway*, we have this to bear in mind, that as such it would *dominate over all others.*

Firstly. Because, between the great “sailing arcs,” as laid down by Maury and others, across the North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, our line from Halifax to some port near the north-western end of Vancouver’s Island, would be that of nearest connection.

Secondly. Our more *northern* route, in its *shorter* arc, is shorter than any possible American one north of Mexico; and, moreover, it lies in the direct line between mid-Europe and mid-China and Japan.

Thirdly. The physical features of the route are far more favorable than the present American one, with *not one half of mountain height* to overcome, and with less snow difficulty, and also less Indian trouble (if any) to contend with—and with coal, wood and water in abundance, for railway function, as well as for settlement, all along.

Fourthly. That with its easier grades and cheaper fuel, besides shortness by about 300 or 400 miles, at least, and with its more economic, though not inferior construction, the Canadian line would assuredly command a fair share of the

VAST TRAFFIC OF THE PACIFIC.

What that is, according to last trade returns (blue book) I

gave, Mr. Editor, in considerable detail in one of my letters in your columns during last session in Ottawa. To repeat, it is

ONE THOUSAND MILLIONS OF DOLLARS PER ANNUM.

Thus, in summary :—

British Pacific Trade, as per return of 1873.....	\$502,287,405
United States Trade, as per return of 1873-4	154,912,438
	<hr/>
	\$657,199,843
Add for Europe (except Britain) say (at least)	342,800,157
	<hr/>
	\$1,000,000,000

On that, the present gross annual transit revenue of the American Pacific Railway line or lines from New York to San Francisco is—as in one of my Britannicus letters of 1869 I estimated it would be—at least \$35,000,000. On this point, I would refer to the annual report of the Government directors *in re* the Union Pacific railroad, who have just filed their annual report for the year ending July 1st, 1875, at Washington. “The gross receipts,” they say, “were \$11,522,021” —“operating expenses, \$4,788,630” —“reduction of debt last year of \$678,000, and a total of \$2,600,000 land grant bonds paid off since the completion of the road.” “Increase” (of revenue) “they estimate can be run up to \$20,000,000 per annum without any increase of its bonded debt.” Finally they conclude by saying: “The road is a vast and valuable property, well cared and well maintained and *capable of returning to the Government the investment it has made therein.*”

This, be it noted, is only as to a portion, and that the most difficult and costly to maintain in the whole route from Atlantic to Pacific. The other parts of the line are not so authentically reported on, but they certainly may be assumed at fully double the above.

Estimating the cost of our line at \$150,000,000 or even \$200,000,000, two per cent. (say about half of the present American percentage on transit revenue of their line) on the said total of Pacific Trade—a fast growing one—would amply pay cost of construction, maintenance, and at the same time give good dividends.

WHY SHOULD WE LOSE ALL THIS!

Besides, why should we lose British Columbia? In her

whole vast area of 350,000 square miles there is abounding wealth. Gold, and other valuable minerals in her mountains'—all over—fertility (beyond compare in our land) in her valleys, vast plateaux, and ever green shores. Her harborage is the best of all the Pacific shore in its whole 50,000 miles of length; and her teeming waters are the richest in the world. A wealth, undeveloped, for empire is there. It is our's by every right under heaven; and ours it is, in duty, to hold to it, and as befits us as men in the families of nations, to use it for weal.

The same considerations, the same sentiments, the same higher sense of duty holds as to our North-west. We, the British people won, and under Providence, are vouchsafed that grand new heritage. Shall we sell it, as a mess of pottage, to another? Have we Canadians no land we can call "our own?" Have we no country with its altars and its hearths, which we may cling to in life? or, are we to be but the victims of a deep-laid treachery?

These are no idle questions. They are evoked by the startled sense of a sudden and portentous danger. In the life of a people, as of the individual, occasion will anon arise, when in crisis, and for "dear life," the arm must strike, and that with utmost force. Such is our present.

Like the unravelment of a vast conspiracy, when once the secret is out, is the development of that "attempt on Canada," which began with the desecration of the sanctities of a private *escritoire*, and which, so far, has but advanced in the same or similar line of path. What then, it may be asked, is

"THE DUTY OF THE HOUR?"

It is, as declared by our Imperial Parliament, with the assent of Her Majesty, in the Preamble of the Union Act—that solemnity under which we assumed, and became professedly, and, in fact, a "Union of certain Provinces," "to conduce to the welfare of these Provinces, and promote the interests of the British Empire."

These are the very words, grave and potent, of the—to us—great and paramount "British North America Act of 1867,"—the command and duty of our Confederation.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, 19th October, 1875.

LETTER No. 7.

How the Government are proceeding under the Act?
 To the Editor of THE CITIZEN :

SIR,—Your exposition of the Sifton, Ward & *Company's* contracts for the construction of certain “links” in Mr. Mackenzie’s telegraph and rail-water scheme for our Pacific railway has just reminded me that I ought to have said more than I did, in my letters in your columns the other day, in this matter of telegraph line in connection with the Pacific Railway. The facts—*esoteric* facts—you bring out in relation to the mysterious contracts *in advance* both for the telegraph line and the so-called Pacific railway of Mr. Mackenzie, suggest to one the propriety of stating more fully, on this head, (Pacific Telegraph Line) the *law* of the case of our statute book.

THE SOLE AUTHORITY FOR THE WORK

is the Act (Dominion) of 1874, Chap. 14, under head, “An Act to provide for the construction of the Pacific Railway,” section 5 of which runs thus :—“A line of electric telegraph shall be constructed in advance of the said railway and branches,” (*i. e.* as described in sections 1 and 2 of the same Act, the “Canadian Pacific Railway” to be “made from some point near to and south of Lake Nipissing to some point in British Columbia on the Pacific Ocean”—these are the very words of Mr. Mackenzie’s own said Act on the subject)—“along their whole extent respectively”—says section 5, now cited—“as soon as possible *after the location of the line shall have been determined on.*”

The particular facts, in relation to the above, worthy of note, are :—

Firstly. That at the time for tender for such work (the telegraph), viz, to 22nd July, 1874, there was *no location of Pacific Railway*, as required by the Act—Act just passed—less than two months before.

Secondly. That the line of route for the telegraph in question, between the mouths of the Kaministiquia and Red River, is not, and can never be, part of the Pacific Railway as contemplated, and in terms in the statute clearly defined.

Thirdly. That as to the British Columbia section, we

have Mr. Mackenzie's own assurance—in his speech at Sarnia the other day—that even yet, the road there is not located.

Fourthly. That a telegraph terminus on the western shore of Lake Superior—eight hundred miles from the Canadian system of telegraph—can be of no use to any one in Canada, *save* those who may pocket the money for such jobbery.

Fifthly. To this day, not an inch of the “Canadian Pacific Railway,” as defined by our statute, and as subsidized by the Imperial Government as well as by the Dominion of Canada, has been “located”—in the sense of the law, viz.—by actual location in field, and deposit of plans thereof, as by law (our statute of 1874 invoking, *ad hoc*, “the Railway Act of 1868”) required.

Sixthly. That the appropriation of one million dollars, specifically for this (the Telegraph) in the “supplies” of last session is in the teeth of the statute, and obviously beyond considerations relating to the Pacific Railway in question.

Finally. That the authorization by Act, chap. 3 of last session, to borrow money, on Dominion Credit, to the amount of \$20,926,666.67 (twenty millions, nine hundred and twenty six thousand, six hundred and sixty-six dollars, sixty-seven cents) *ostensibly* for “*Balance of Loan for Canadian Pacific Railway*,” is one, which in the light of recent developments, calls for jealous regard on the part of the people most concerned.

More, on this head, might be said, but, for the present, it is well for all to watch, and as things fall out and tell, act, or prepare to act, decisively.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, 26th Oct., 1875.

LETTER No. 8.

Repudiation by Ministry.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN:

The report, just received, of the success of Canada's Finance Minister in negotiating a further loan, of something over \$12,000,000, say twelve million and a half, in the London Money Market, suggests a remark or two, in sequence to what I have just advanced in your columns.

Of this amount, three-fifths are, it is authoritatively stated, covered by the

IMPERIAL GUARANTEE.

As to that guarantee, extending to £2,500,000 sterling, say about \$12,500,000, it is to be remarked, that it was

PRINCIPALLY FOR THE PACIFIC RAILWAY,

As then (1871) when granted, contemplated in the terms of Union with British Columbia, and as defined in our statute (the Canadian Pacific Railway Act) of 1872.

Whether the other two-fifths of this special guarantee has been already touched in this very large loan (about \$20,000,000) of last year, does not, so far as I have been able to gather, appear. But be that as it may, we have now the fact, that we have

ON IT, BORROWED MONEY TO THE EXTENT OF AT LEAST \$9,000,000.

And at the same time have used the credit for floating, conjunctly, a few millions more of our own unguaranteed paper, and which, of course, indirectly, got the benefit of the Imperial Guarantee. The result of which was an allocation, on 4 per cent. interest, at only about $1\frac{1}{4}$ (one and a quarter) per cent. below par. Whether or not, this was a "good loan" for Canada, I leave others to show. What I purpose to show now, is, that, in this transaction there is

SOMETHING MOST QUESTIONABLE.

Let me explain myself, and for that I must crave indulgence for reference to "dry law"—statutes—on the subject. I shan't be long.

The first act under which the present Ministry borrowed and continue to borrow money, is Chapter 2 of Dominion Session of 1874—in the preamble of which it is textually stated, as ground of loan, that—"Whereas, one of the terms and conditions on which the Colony of British Columbia was admitted into union with the Dominion of Canada, by an Order of Her Majesty in Council of the sixteenth day of May, 1871, was that the Government of the Dominion should secure the construction of a *railway* (in this Act referred to as the Pacific Railway) to connect the seaboard of British Columbia with the railway system of Canada, in the manner more particularly mentioned in the schedules to the said order.

“ And whereas it is expedient to raise by way of loan for the purpose of the construction of the Pacific Railway, and also for the improvement and enlargement of Canadian canals, a sum not exceeding eight millions sterling.” * * * *

“ And whereas by the Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, known as “ The Canadian (Public Works) Loan Act of 1873 ”—after the recital of the facts aforesaid,” (viz., as to loan for Pacific Railway and canals, and one million one hundred thousand pounds sterling for fortifications under “ The Canada Defences Loan Act of 1870 ”)—“ and that it is expedient to authorize the Treasury ” (British) “ to guarantee a portion not exceeding two million five hundred thousand pounds of such loan of eight million pounds sterling for the above mentioned purposes, and to guarantee a further portion of the said loan not exceeding one million one hundred thousand pounds ” (sterling) “ in substitution for a guarantee of a loan under “ The Canada Defences Loan Act, 1870 ”—the said Act is repealed ; and it is enacted that, subject to certain conditions to be observed by the Parliament of Canada the Treasury may guarantee in such manner and form, and on such conditions as they think fit, the payment of the principal and interest (at a rate not exceeding four per cent. per annum) on all or any part of any loan raised by the Government of Canada for the purpose of the construction of the PACIFIC RAILWAY and the improvement and enlargement of the Canadian canals,” (i.e., I take it, canals—comparatively limited—as contemplated at the date of the Imperial Act, *ad hoc*, viz., 36 37 v. ch. 45)—“ so that the total amount so guaranteed from time to time ”—continues the preamble—“ do not exceed three million six hundred thousand pounds.”

Professedly in accordance with this preamble the Act (ch. 2 of 1874) was passed. Under it Mr. Cartwright made his great loan of last year. Under it, we find moreover in the Supplies of that year, the following special votes [page 13] as to the Pacific Railway :

Fort Garry and Pembina Railway.....	\$ 650,000
Pacific Railway Survey.....	500,000
Pacific Railway construction, and improvements on navigable waters in interior in connection therewith.....	1,500,000

In all, then.....\$2,650,000

In the following session, last past, we have in chap. 3 of it, the following further authorization for loan, sec. 6. "And whereas, there remain unborrowed and negotiable of the loans authorized by Parliament for the several works hereinafter mentioned," &c.,—*inter alia*.—"Balance of the loan for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway \$20,926,666,67.

[Twenty millions, nine hundred and twenty-six thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars, sixty-seven cents.]

In connection with the above, in the supplies of last session [page 15 of statutes,] under the head "Pacific Railway" we have a total of \$6,250,000, including an item of \$2,000,000 for steel rails and fastenings," and an item—a re-vote, I take it—of \$500,000 for "Pembina Branch."

Taking all these facts together, it may fairly be assumed that the present Government have by loan, as stated, drawn all or nearly all, that was vouchsafed to us in the Imperial guarantee for the Pacific Railway.

The money secured—pocketed in a sense—they now openly avow their policy of no Pacific Railway!

In the meantime, not an inch of the road has been built. The whole is emphatically repudiated, and with it every solemn compact and obligation relating to it. As to the "steel rails"—a stern reality—they, I presume, will sell well as "old iron," and will just answer the AMERICAN line across our border, and thence into our Fort Garry.

But, apart from the aspects of the case, in its material features, there is a higher consideration at stake in this wondrous scheme of revolution by "organized hypocrisy," &c. It is the *honor of the Canadian name!* What of it?

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

Ottawa, 2nd Nov. 1875.

LETTER No. 9.

Misappropriation of North-West Lands.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN.

SIR,—This, to the Dominion, is a vital matter. It has just come to my notice in reading the report of the "Foster contract" for the building of the so-called "Georgian Bay Branch of the Canadian Pacific Railway."

The 7th clause of that contract, as laid before the House, runs thus :—“The road to be constructed in conformity with the C. P. Railway Act of 1874, and subject to all its provisions *except those which provide for the land appropriated having a certain frontage on the railway*; and inasmuch as the Dominion Government may not become proprietors of land on this railway, the contractor will receive land *in some other portion of the Dominion.*”

The only statutory enactment on the subject is section 4 of chapter 14 of last session of our Dominion Parliament under the head “Canadian Pacific Railway,” to wit:—“That a quantity of land not exceeding twenty thousand acres for each mile of the section or sub-section contracted for, shall be appropriated in alternate sections of twenty square miles each *along the line of the said railway, or at a convenient distance therefrom*, each section having a frontage of not less than three miles nor more than six miles on the line of the said railway, &c. * * * * * ”

And when a sufficient quantity cannot be found in the immediate vicinity of the railway, then the same quantity, or as much as may be required to complete such quantity, shall be appropriated at such other places as may be determined by the Governor in Council.”

The obvious meaning of the above is that the land so granted shall be *on* the line, or if it cannot be found, then the *nearest* that can be found, *but no other*, shall be available for the purpose. This limitation to line of route is an essential principle in all such subsidies, and from the exceptional character of the act (alienation of public lands “Crown desmesne”) it is to be strictly, *i.e.*, most restrictively interpreted. The quantity is in consideration of the mixed quality, *bad as well as good*, on the line of route. In the face of all this we have now before us, pressed with the force of an immense majority, the proposition that by a statute of our land, may, and *shall*, nearly two millions of acres of the “very pick” of our North West lands, practically be granted to the Boston or other foreign capitalists (represented by Mr. Foster), capitalists, who to raise revenue for their Hoosac Tunnel and its costly lines incidental, and to secure *unto themselves* our North West transit trade, thus extend to us

their arms. The present selling price of these lands, in the outskirts of settlement, even before the issue of a single patent, or promise of title in any shape, is from \$4 to \$10 per acre for pre-emption or squatter rights. So said Dr. Tupper in his speech the other night on the matter of Pacific Railway, and we believe he was right. But our immense and most valuable

COAL LANDS

“measures” of good economic seams, running up to twenty feet in thickness, cropping out in surface or river bank, and that most abundantly on the direct line of railway or other road route from Red River to the Yellow Head, or, in fact, to any of our Rocky Mountain Passes, are worth infinitely more, and may, before long, whenever touched by rail or settlement, be worth thousands of dollars per acre. As to our

GOLD LANDS,

they also may, I presume, be so given away. These are startling facts, and should draw the closest and most jealous attention to this scheme of Georgian Bay Branch subsidy. Relatively also should these facts prompt *some* scrutiny at least, as to the item of (only) \$6,250,000 [six millions odd] of dollars “for the Pacific Railway,” and on which, Messrs. Mackenzie and Blake, on the *first* occasion of debate thereon, so ruthlessly tried to gag all constitutional debate!

WHAT ARE WE ?

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, 10th March, 1875.

LETTER No. 10.

Lake Superior—Eastern Terminus [“for all Time”] of the “Canadian” Pacific Railway.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN :

SIR,—From what would appear some exceptional irregularity [suppressive] in the distribution, even amongst members of Parliament [at least those on the “Opposition”] of the papers [printed] in the matter of “the British Columbia difficulty,” as “settled” by the intervention, in arbitration,

of the Right Honorable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, I have been unable to get communication of the important documents until to-day. They are too voluminous for mastery at a glance, but even in a cursory glance, I find enough to somewhat surprise anyone not in the secret.

In page 38 of the blue book on this subject, under the head, "Copy of a Report of a Committee of the Honorable the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 17th September, 1874," I find the following in response to the Earl of Carnarvon's proposition:—

"The fourth condition involves another precise engagement to have the *whole* of the railway communication finished in 1890. There are the strongest possible objections to again adopting a precise time for the completion of the lines. The *eastern* portion of the line, except so far as the mere letter of the conditions is concerned, affects only the *Provinces east of Manitoba, and the Government have not been persuaded either of the wisdom or the necessity of immediately constructing that portion of the railway which traverses the country from the west end of Lake Superior to the proposed eastern terminus on Lake Nipissing near Georgian Bay, nor is it conceived that the people of British Columbia could, with any show of reason whatever, insist that this portion of the work should be completed within any definite time, inasmuch as if the people, who are chiefly if not wholly affected by this branch of the undertaking, are satisfied* [?], it is maintained that the people of British Columbia would practically have no right of speech in the matter."

* * * * *

"The committee advise that Lord Carnarvon be informed that while *in no case* could the Government undertake the completion of the *whole line* in the time mentioned, an extreme unwillingness exists to another limitation of time; but if it be found absolutely necessary to secure a present settlement of the controversy by *further concessions* a pledge may be given that THE PORTION WEST of Lake Superior will be completed so as to afford connection by rail with the existing lines of railway through a portion of the United States and by Canadian waters during the season of navigation by the year 1890 as suggested."

In page 42 of the same blue book, we have Lord Carnarvon's final reply on this point thus : " 5. Lastly, that " on or before the 31st of December, 1890, the railway shall " be completed and open for traffic from the Pacific seaboard " to a point at the *Western end of Lake Superior*, at which it " will fall into connection with existing lines of railway " through a portion of the United States, and also with the " navigation on Canadian waters. To proceed at present " with the remainder of the railway extending by the country " northward of Lake Superior, to the existing Canadian " lines, ought not in my opinion, to be required, and the " time for undertaking that work must be determined by " the developement of settlement and the changing cir- " cumstances of the country. The day is, however, I hope " not very distant when a continuous line of railway " through Canadian Territory will be practicable, and I " therefore look upon this portion of the scheme as POSTPONED " rather than abandoned.

The italicization is my own, to obviate, for brevity comment.

These extracts speak for themselves !

Read by the light of surrounding facts—*inter alia*, the fact, that the 500 miles and upwards of navigation from our most westerly lake ports to the eastern terminus in question is, in a sense, virtually American, per force of the American *Sault Ste. Marie Canal*—*sole link* of those great waters—the great scheme as laid now, is essentially one to serve the interests of the *United States* rather than Canada proper, or Britain. That at least I believe is the opinion of some, if not the bulk, of the people of Canada.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, March 16th, 1875.

LETTER No. 11.

British Columbia Settlement.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN :

SIR,—In sequel to my last, I have only to add, as the conclusions to which every unbiased reader of the papers in question must arrive at on this subject.

1. That the determined policy of the present Ministry, from first to last, has been to have *no* Canadian Pacific Railway, as proposed and agreed to between Canada and British Columbia, and as implemented by Dominion Act, ch. 71 of 35 Vic, and as subsidized by the Imperial Government.

2. That the expression of "hope" on the part of Lord Carnarvon, that the section from Nipissing to Red River is to be considered as only "postponed rather than abandoned" (see page 42 of Blue Book), has not been acceded to by the present Ministry, but that, on the contrary, their avoidance of that line by *now* fixing the eastern terminus at the mouth of the Kaministiquia River, about seventy miles south of that line (the Nipigon one), reported by the chief engineer of the work, Mr. Fleming, as the shortest and best in that quarter, precludes all such hope, so long as they rule in the matter.

3. That the practical effect of such break (one of about 900 miles distance from the south-east corner of Lake Nipissing to Rat Portage, north end of the Lake of the Woods,) would be to make all our North West territories and British Columbia an appanage of the United States in all commercial relations, and with a tendency, naturally, to a change of "flag" and social status in that direction.

4. That in this view, all expenditure in public works, or even Government, west of the foot of Sault Ste. Marie (the western limit of Canadian navigation proper), is worse than a mere waste of public money belonging to Canada.

5. That as the object of scarcely secondary moment in the scheme of a Canadian Pacific Railway as originally laid, the great Pacific trade between Great Britain, Europe, and the Eastern States was sought to be touched, and that to that end the road in question should be in every sense a through one, and short and good as possible, between the two Oceans.

6. That that trade, even already, as appears by the last official returns [of which I gave you, Mr. Editor, details in my pamphlet herewith enclosed], amounts, for Britain and the United States alone, to nearly \$700,000,000 [seven hundred million dollars]; and that on it, even at the start, the

American Commercial Marine [Pacific] and the American Transcontinental Railways are fast growing rich.

7. That the present Ministry seem to ignore this element of transcontinental general transit trade, and pretend to treat the work as a merely domestic one.

I close here for the present, but shall continue the subject.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA March 19th, 1875.

LETTER No. 12.

International Highway.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN :

SIR,—In continuation, let me add the following consideration on this subject.

8. That it is in this larger view that by the earliest and, in fact, by all sincere advocates of a British American railway, from Atlantic to Pacific, this scheme has been chiefly urged.

That this has been done from an intelligent appreciation of the following facts.

a. That we hold the most northern and shortest arc possible for railway from ocean to ocean, north of Mexico.

b. That our higher latitude bears, in terrene oblate, a lower level than any south.

c. That the physical features and natural resources of the whole country on our line of route, are no less favorable, but the contrary, for railway construction and maintenance, than the present American one, the summits and general line in our route being in height less than half that of the American one in question, or any other possible in the whole area of the United States, and with less snow difficulty to contend with.

d. That our route is in direct line of connection with the two great "sailing arcs" (ocean highways) of the Northern Atlantic and Pacific, a line of best commercial transit from mid-Asia to mid Europe, shorter, on an average (accord-

ing to reports) by 1,000 to 2,000 miles than by San Francisco.

e. That the trade according to the last official returns for 1873-74 of Great Britain and the United States, even already, and with remarkably rapid ratio of increase since the establishment of a transcontinental railway to San Francisco with its incidental Pacific steamship lines in every direction, amounts to nearly \$700,000,000, viz:—

BRITISH PACIFIC TRADE—A.D. 1873.

China, including Hong Kong and Macao.....	\$151,126,975
Japan.....	45,877,500
Islands in the Pacific.....	861,625
Straits Settlements.....	38,681,595
Australian Colonies and New Zealand.....	366,739,710
Total.....	<u>\$503,287,405</u>

UNITED STATES TRADE—A.D. 1873-4 to JUNE 30th, 1874.

Japanese Free Ports.....	50,322,547
“China and Japan” (thus lumped in blue book, see pages 124,433, meaning China and Japan exclusive of Japanese Free Ports.....	54,221,554
British East Indies and Australia (thus lumped in blue book)	25,147,607
Sandwich Islands.....	2,013,461
Dutch East Indies.....	7,812,088
Bullion—China and Japan.....	15,395,181
Total.....	<u>\$154,912,438</u>

SUMMARY OF TOTALS.

British Pacific Trade.....	\$503,287,405
United States do	154,912,438
	<u>\$658,199,843</u>

Add, for the rest of Europe, say, fairly, one half of that and we have a grand total of at least \$1,000,000,000 (one thousand million dollars). Two per cent. on which (an extremely minimum predicate) would, most probably, pay cost and something over.

9. That this consideration of the route as a *through* one, for general and international trade, was not advanced, nor even mentioned by either of the parties, in submitting their respective “cases” to Lord CARNARVON, as arbitrator; and, in fact, as appears by report of “Minute of Council,” our Government seemed to studiously exclude it, by limiting the

field for consideration to British Columbia and "nearest" railway connection eastward, viz., with the United States "system" of railways by the Pembina branch, and with "Canadian navigation" on the western shore of Lake Superior, expressly, at the same time, denying the right of British Columbia to urge any considerations for the eastern section of the road as proposed and contemplated by clause 11 of the original "Terms of Union" of British Columbia with Canada. The language in the Minute of Council in question (see page 38) on this point, is so marked as to call for citation. "The eastern portion, except so far as the mere letter of the conditions is concerned, affects only the Provinces east of Manitoba, * * * * * "the people of British Columbia would practically have no right of speech in the matter!"

Lord CARNARVON, as arbitrator, could decide on the case or cases, *only as laid before him*, and certainly this question of "right of speech" as to this eastern section, was not left to him, but on the contrary, he was in a sense, told not to touch it. *Yet, Sir, he did*, and that in a manner emphatic, imperative, though gentle. As England's present chief guardian in such matters, he spoke. It is for us, the people of Canada, to respond. On this point and others I shall conclude in my next.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

LETTER No. 13.

* International Highway.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN:

SIR,—Taking up this theme where I closed in my last, I have to say:—

10. That Lord Carnarvon, in his *obiter dictum*, in which he was pleased to say that he considered the eastern section merely "postponed and not abandoned," and that he "hoped"—to use his own words—"that the day is not very far distant when a *continuous* line of railway through Canadian territory will be practicable"—that is to say, I take it, railway completed and in working order—did, in effect, urge that to be done as soon as possible.

That the first consideration in such a work which weighs in the Imperial mind, and that, as one of first and highest moment, is the military one in relation to those parts of the empire more immediately affected by it.

To that consideration we of Canada, as an integral part of the empire, are equally, and, in fact, more especially, bound.

Moreover, the British Government has, in a manner which, so far as we know, bespeaks a desire to encourage us to such a work, offered, as a first offering or "luck penny," a subsidy of £2,500,000 stg. That is now at our command for *the Canadian Pacific Railway*, as determined at the time of the grant, and *not*, I take it, for the pro-American scheme of the present Government, Chap. 2 of last session *non obstante*.

11. This eastern section, for a distance of from 700 to 900 miles [according to what may hereafter be determined as the western boundary of the Province of Ontario] runs through the Province of Ontario, whose Government, though thereunto applied to by the Dominion Government, has, so far, declined to say or do aught with regard to the disposal of her lands in Pacific railway subsidy, as proposed by the Dominion. That in alternative, in the case of the so-called Georgian Bay Branch of the Pacific Railway, the present Government have bound themselves to give an equal extent in some other part (without defining where or whereabouts) in the North-west territories of the Dominion of Canada.

That the illegality and unconstitutional character of such alienation of the Crown domain—one, if *largely* applied, fraught with dangers that strike at the very root of political liberty in such a new field of social organization and government—forbid its application to the 700 or 900 miles in question through Ontario.

That a land subsidy as to this portion may be assumed as an impracticability on the part of the Dominion Government.

12. That to meet the difficulty, and under considerations which obviously commend themselves in the relations of Canada and the Parent State as to such a work, the British Government should, I humbly think, be respectfully re-

quested to further aid the work in question by a supplementary subsidy, say of £3,000,000 sterling, making, with the previous £2,500,000 sterling, a total subsidy of £5,500,000 sterling, sufficient, probably, to cover half the cost of this section.

That the whole of this be applicable to the construction solely of the eastern section, from the eastern terminus, as first fixed by the Act of Parliament [Chap. 71 of 35 Vic.], to the western boundary of Ontario [wherever that may be].

That in consideration of such subsidy the determination [location] of the precise point or place of such eastern terminus, and of all main objective points along the whole line of route to the Pacific shore, and the terminus [temporary or permanent] there, be left entirely to the Imperial authorities. But that all subsequent work in construction shall be under the control of the Dominion Government, subject, however, to such regulations as may be prescribed and agreed to for the proper application of such subsidy in the progress of the work.

That such work on the eastern section shall be begun at the eastern terminus as soon as the same can be reached by rail or boat navigation, and simultaneously, or before that, and as soon as possible, at or from the head of Nepigon Bay, or such point thereabout as may seem advisable, and that from such point the work shall be prosecuted eastward and westward with all possible energy in the most direct line possible, and without any digression towards the Dawson route, other than connection at Rat Portage at the head of the Lake of the Woods, or wherever, thereabouts, the engineer in chief of the railway in question may advise.

That westward from the boundary of Ontario the land grant system, as provided by the first statute (chapter 71 of 35 vic.) of the Dominion Parliament on the subject shall apply in connection with the money subsidy therein provided—or such further sum for the purpose as may be determined on by the Parliament of Canada.

That in the meantime all the works now in hand or initiated, in connection with the Pacific Railway, or having any subsidiary relation thereto do proceed as determined on by Parliament.

I have still a remark or two to make before I can well conclude, but for that I must, Mr. Editor, crave your indulgence to another and really last letter.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, March 24th, 1875.

LETTER No. 14.

Our Heritage in Jeopardy.

To the Editor of THE CITIZEN:

SIR,—In conclusion, I would respectfully ask attention for a moment or two to the physical features, and also incidentally, to the political aspects of the case in this respect.

Taking any true map of British North America, we may observe, first, the compact *unity*—a feature itself an element of strength in a country—of the whole vast terrain.

In area, we find from best authorities, that it is three and a quarter millions of square miles, or within about one hundred thousand square miles of that assigned to the United States. Of this total of Canada and Newfoundland, no less than 2,206,725 square miles, according to the official report [1872, page 14] of the Surveyor-General of Dominion Lands, fall under the head of "Dominion Lands," and which, of course, are exclusive of Provincial lands.

To this Dominion land total let us add, for our present argument, the 350,000 square miles of British Columbia and we have a grand total of over two millions and a half of square miles, north and west of us, and which, for the nonce, we may term our new grand heritage of the North West.

From the silver gleaming shores of Lake Superior to the furthest golden mountain heights and isles of British Columbia, a stretch of 2,000 miles with an average cereal breadth of 500 miles, is the grandest and richest virgin field for homesteads on earth. I know the land. On its far, northern border I was born, and in early life, side by side with my father, thence traversed it from Pacific to Atlantic, and have touched its three oceans.

Let us glance at its boundaries, for they also, I hold, are elements of strength unto the country. On the east, we see,

as to any effort in war, a broad and impassable belt of hyperborean ice-hill and field, and a rock-bound, ever tempest tossed coast. On the west (British Columbia) a vast mountain, mural, rock coast, deeply fiorded, with abounding sheltering harbors, but utterly unassailable to any naval force, save, in the immediate coast (a very limited one) of the Georgian Gulf, under the guns of our lost San Juan. On our north is the intangible Arctic. On the south we have from Puget Sound to the Rocky Mountains, a system of vast and insurmountable mountain ranges running in varied directions, Ossa on Pelion piled, and with passages so few, narrow and difficult, that no aggressive force could cope with any military resistance in such Thermopylæ. From the Rocky Mountains to Pembina we have, in defence, the so-called "American Desert," the Prairie of the Southern Saskatchewan, the home of the ever (to Britain) loyal Bedouins of the Plains—men of utmost fight and ever fiercest hate against their traditional "enemies"—the "Boston Long Knives, or, briefly," "The Long Knives," with such native army of Sikhs "true to their salt," the British North West could well hold its own. From Pembina to Lake Superior is a region of swamp and high rugged rock impassable to military movement. Arrived at Lake Superior we find ourselves on what, practically in every point of view, are American (U.S.) waters, for that Power, in and by virtue of its Sault Ste. Marie canal, *alone holds* the means of placing war craft on this inner and thus dominating "sea." On its death-still northern boundary ("the British") shores, no British arsenal, port nor jetty, can furnish aught for fight. To transport material thither, for vessel construction, or gunboat of even smallest type, is utterly impossible without a railway from the nearest Atlantic port, say Montreal, Quebec or Halifax, to say, the sheltered head of Nepigeon Bay.

As to Lake Huron, on its northern shores especially, the same misfortune and difficulty, but in modified degree, would occur.

In this—this immense unbridged, unroaded, untouched wild between us of settled (older) Canada, and our younger self in Manitoba—is our fatal weakness. Military authorities tell us so. We see it.

But worse still. While neglecting to open a military roadway (rail) for our defence and commercial convenience, by our unassailable North, we construct one from the very fort gate of our enemy on our southern border to within the very portals—unguarded—of the capital of our heritage. In other words, a Pembina and Winnipeg railway, without one wholly on our own ground from the railway system of Eastern Canada, would be a thing ever of menace or, in case of war, of destruction to our national interests throughout all the North and West of our Dominion. On the other hand, with the latter, with ~~the~~ countervailing power and effect, it would, in war, be comparatively or perfectly harmless, and in peace be but useful.

Hence the “necessity,” as has ever been urged by the original promoters—^{as} necessary Imperial as well as Canadian—that the scheme of a British American Pacific Railway should be one from seaport to seaport, *continuous*, straight, strong, and short as possible, but touching, on military and commercial considerations, certain objective points.

Thus was the contract—one based on statute specific *ad hoc*—carefully implemented by the late Government. *Thus* did the *people* of all Canada vote for it. At the Napierville hustings—on or close to the memorable battle field of old Chateauguay—Chief Justice Dorion, then a candidate, and the recognized chief of the *avowed* “annexation” section of the present Government, distinctly said to his anxious constituents, and to the country in general, then and there, that “*their scheme would be, in the main, that of the late Government, id est* as a through and continuous railway from the railway system of Eastern Canada to the Pacific. For *that*, and *that alone*, I repeat, was the electoral vote of all Canada cast. Mr. Mackenzie’s prelections on the theme were, it is true, somewhat, and rather rapidly, varied, especially about the American border, but in the “*main*” they were as publicly declared by his honorable colleague.

It was not the “scheme” that was, at the electoral urn condemned, but it was the “story” of its moving as got up, for a purpose, to the popular ear. It was, in fact, *too good, too great, too transcendent* in brimful promise of good to all con-

cerned in it for any *rival* interest or adverse national power to passively let slip. Hence the record—scarce not treasonous—of its defeat—so far! Shall it rest so?

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

March 23rd, 1875.



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